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Chairman; JAMES M. BYRNE, 
Commissioner; BRIAN T. STEWART, 
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Commissioner, 
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
I. 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS WERE INSUFFICIENT 
TO APPRISE THE COURT OF THE BASIS FOR ITS 
DECISION. 
The respondents correctly point out that the standard of 
review of mixed questions of law and fact is an intermediate 
standard. This intermediate standard requires that the 
Commission's decisions must "fall within the limits of 
reasonableness or rationality." Utah Dept. of Administrative 
Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 
1983). Under this standard, the Court examines the Commission's 
decision to determine if it is reasonable, with reference to 
the specific terms of the underlying legislation and the public 
policies sought to be served. Spreader Specialists, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 738 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 
1987). The underlying legislation requires that all rates 
charged be just and reasonable, Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (1986), 
and the public policy has been expressed as offering the public 
the best possible and most economical telephone service. See, 
Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v. Public Service 
Commission, supra, 658 P.2d at 611; Silver Beehive Tel. Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 30 Utah 2d 44, 46, 512 P.2d 1327, 
1328-29 (1973). In order for the Court to apply this standard 
of review, however, the Commission must set forth facts in 
sufficient detail as to allow the Court to perform its duty of 
reviewing the order and protecting the public from arbitrary 
and capricious administrative action. 
Respondents make an attempt to distinguish the Court's 
decisions in Milne Truck Lines, 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986), and 
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981). No attempt to 
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distinguish these cases on the facts, however, can disguise the 
clear legal principle stated therein that it is "essential that 
the Commission make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail 
that the critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted 
and resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is 
a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions." Milne 
Truck Lines, supra, 720 P.2d at 1378. There must be findings 
on all material issues and the findings must be sufficiently 
detailed to "disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual 
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are 
reached." ^d.; Mountain States Legal Foundation, supra, 636 
P.2d at 1058. 
The Commission clearly failed to make detailed subsidiary 
findings that disclose the steps by which its ultimate con-
clusions are reached in its Report and Order of October 29, 
1985 (the "Report and Order"). Its lengthy summary of 
testimony of witnesses and its conclusory Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law do not "disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and 
law are reached. ..." Milne Truck Lines, supra, 720 P.2d at 
1378. 
For example, the respondents argue that the Access Tariff 
is based in part on the finding that intrastate FGA service was 
identical to interstate FGA service for which the FCC had 
already developed a cost supported rate. Respondents' Brief, 
p. 23. If this is the case, the Commission failed to explain 
why it did not mirror the FCC rates which included a discount 
for FGA service. Instead, the Commission based its Access 
Tariff on the non-discounted interstate access charge. 
Although conflicting evidence was introduced about the need for 
a discount, the Commission did not even address the issue and 
made no subsidiary findings that disclose the basis for its 
ultimate finding that the Access Tariff was just and reason-
able. R. 2721. The Commission's finding that the Access 
Tariff is just and reasonable is not supported by subordinate 
findings of fact. 
As set forth below, even if the Court determines that the 
Report and Order was sufficiently detailed, the Commissions' 
decision that the Access Tariff rates were fair and reasonable 
must be set aside. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT THE RATES ARE 
JUST AND REASONABLE. 
A. Although Cost Of Service May Not Be The Only Factor 
Properly Considered In Setting Rates, It Is The Only Factor 
Considered By The Commission In Establishing The Utah Access 
Tariff. 
Respondents properly point out to the court that cost of 
service is not the sole factor to be considered by the 
Commission in its analysis of whether a proposed rate is just 
and reasonable. Respondents' Brief at 26, et seq. See also 
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), cited by respondents. 
Nevertheless, in the matter before the court, Mountain Bell and 
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the Independent Carriers, as well as the Commission itself, 
treated the access charge tariff proposal before the Commission 
as one in which virtually the sole criterion was "cost of 
service." The issue of establishing an access charge was posed 
by the PSC in a portion of the fourth question set forth in its 
Order of June 1, 1984, as follows: 
How should the intranstate allocation of non-traffic 
sensitive costs be apportioned between the inter-LATA 
carriers access charges, intra-LATA carriers access 
charges, intra-LATA message telecommunication service 
and wide area telecommunication service rates and the 
rates for local exchange services? 
See R. 2714-15 (emphasis added). That procedural order set the 
stage for the hearings which resulted in the Report and Order, 
which is the subject of this appeal. The PSC's question was 
repeated in paragraph 1 of its Findings of Fact, with the 
following answer: 
. . . These changes should be based on the 
non-discounted interstate access charges 
implemented by the FCC. Non-traffic sensi-
tive cost should be apportioned between all 
services, but a Utah specific analysis is 
required for this purpose. 
R. 2715. 
The Commission further established cost as the basis for 
the Access Tariff in Finding of Fact No. 7: 
7. Competitors in the intrastate toll market need to 
cover the cost they impose on the network. Rates for 
services to interexchange carriers should be set to 
cover the cost of interexchange carriers' usage of the 
network as well as connection costs. 
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R. 2721. The Commission went on to deny requested time-of-day 
pricing for Feature Group A and Feature Group B in Finding of 
Fact No. 8, which stated that such pricing "has not been cost 
justified in this proceeding and should be denied without 
prejudice." R. 2721. Finally, in Finding of Fact No. 18, the 
Commission required the establishment of a telecommunications 
task force to develop Utah-specific costs, which were "required 
for purposes of appropriately allocating NTS costs to access 
charges." R. 2723. 
Thomas A. Garcia stated Mountain Bell's position in this 
regard: 
Our recommendation in the very near term is the 
acceptance and application of access charges as they 
have been filed. Inherent in those access charges are 
non-traffic sensitive cost recovery elements. . . . 
R. 0079-80. See also, Brief of Petitioners at 33-40. 
Thus, it was the proponents of the access charge and the 
Commission itself who raised the issue of cost justification as 
the raison d' etre and virtually the sole basis for the proposed 
tariff in this proceeding. The nature of the proposed access 
charge itself, i.e., a rate which would be set at a level 
calculated to ensure payment of a proper share of non-traffic 
sensitive costs and which would be further designed to sub-
sidize local exchange costs (e.g., R. 0081, 1216) requires the 
examination and evaluation of such cost data in order to make a 
rational decision as to access charge levels. Nevertheless, 
such cost data was not presented to the Commission. 
-6-
B. Even If Cost Of Service Were Not The Sole Criterion On 
Which The Utah Access Tariff Could Have Been Established, 
Respondents' Have Shown No Other Basis On Which Those Tariffs 
Can Be Sustained. 
Respondents argue at length that "cost of service" is not 
the sole criterion by which to judge the reasonableness of 
utility rates. The respondents cite various cases and author-
ities which support consideration of other factors, principally 
value of service (see e.g., Brief of Respondents, pp. 27 - 30); 
but nowhere do respondents point out any evidence in the Record, 
or in the Findings of Fact in the Report and Order, which 
provide any basis for the Commission's decision establishing 
the Access Tariff. In simple fact, there is no substantial 
evidence in the record as to value of service or any other 
factor, including cost of service, which supports the tariffs 
proposed by Mountain Bell and adopted by the Commission. 
C. The Evidence At The Hearing Was Insufficient To 
Support The Commission's Decision Implementing The Utah Access 
Tariff. 
Respondents rely on the testimony of Cary Hinton of the 
Division of Public Utilities as being substantial enough to 
support the Commission's decision. Mr. Hinton's testimony must 
be reviewed in light of several factors which cut against its 
sufficiency on the issue of Utah cost justification of the 
tariff. Other witnesses, including Mountain Bell's, testified 
that they did not know whether Utah-specific cost data, when 
available, would show costs lower, higher or the same as the 
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cost data underlying the FCC tariff. See Brief of Petitioners 
at pp. 35-39. 
Further, Mr. Hinton's testimony itself, as a whole, shows 
that the data underlying the FCC tariff was not the cost data 
required to support the Utah Access Tariff. See R. 1493-94, 
1580-81, 1611-12, 1627, 1638, 1650-51. Particularly notable is 
Mr. Hinton's testimony which immediately follows that cited by 
respondents: 
Q. Would it be fair to say that, in fact at 
this point, Mountain Bell has represented that they do 
not yet have cost data to support the level of rates 
which they are proposing? 
A. As I have indicated previously, there is not 
specific Utah cost data that supports the rate levels 
that are in these tariffs and that is why we have 
recommended a further proceeding in development of 
cost studies. 
R.1671-72. Thus, Mr. Hinton himself does not claim for his 
testimony the significance or meaning that Respondents seek to 
give it. 
Respondents contention that the Commission could have 
relied on a one page exhibit presented by Mr. Garcia (R. 4414) 
is also unjustified. Assuming that the information presented 
is true, i.e., that under the proposed access charges Mountain 
Bell would contribute approximately the same level of NTS cost 
support at the local exchange level as would the resellers 
under the access charge, the exhibit adds nothing to the 
question of whether the cost support levels themselves were 
justifiable. The fact that two parties may be equally burdened 
does not mean that the burden itself is fair. 
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It should be noted, as well, that Mr. Garcia testified 
throughout the proceedings that the necessary cost data to 
support the proposed tariff was not available. His exhibit 
does nothing to contradict that position. 
D. Mountain Bell's Subsequent General Rate Proceeding Did 
Not Resolve Its Failure To Provide Revenue Data To The 
Commission With Regard To The Access Tariff Proposals. 
Mountain Bell testified that it feared that the existence 
of competition in the intrastate toll market would result in 
loss of revenue necessary to support local loop costs; the 
access charge was proposed to cover this revenue loss. There 
was no evidence presented to the Commission, however, to 
quantify the projected revenue loss at more than $1,000,000.00 
or to quantify the projected revenue gain at any particular 
level at all. Lloyd Tanner, testifying for Mountain Bell on 
this subject, stated that "We don't have any idea as to the buy 
up, what kind of revenues we might experience [other than as to 
AT&T]", that different rates than those proposed had not been 
tested as to revenue effect and that "all we are doing is 
mirroring the FCC rate." R. 0342. 
Mountain Bell was not mirroring the FCC rate, however, as 
(in its second tariff filing) it had rejected the 55% discount 
for non-premium access contained in the FCC tariff. (See Brief 
of Petitioners at 18-19 for explanation.) Mountain Bell 
presented no justification for its proposal that the Commission 
accept one part of the FCC tariff, while rejecting another, 
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other than to argue (ironically, it is assumed) that the 
discount was not cost-based (Ld.) and that it wanted the addi-
tional revenue to be gained by eliminating the 55% FCC 
discount. The following illuminating exchange took place 
during the testimony of Mr. Tanner: 
Q. The only figure we have to work with at the 
present time is a $1 million potential revenue loss, 
though. The rest of [the projected revenue loss] is 
just conjecture at this point. 
A. Well, I think that's what I've indicated in my 
testimony. 
Q. . . . [Alssuming for a moment that just $1 million 
is at stake. Shouldn't we take the discounted [FCC 
tariff] rate and simply increase that to a level that 
would protect that $1 million as opposed to going to 
the full premium [FCC tariff] rate at this time until 
we can get those cost based studies? 
A. Our proposal would be that we would implement the 
full rate as we had proposed and that any advantage or 
windfall that the company might experience as a result 
of this, should there be any, . . . would be reflected 
in local rates or in some other method at the discre-
tion of the Commission. 
Q. You wouldn't propose returning those additional 
tariffs back to the resellers? 
A. No, we would not. 
Q. And the consequences to the resellers in the 
interim may be fairly severe based on price increases 
they're going to have to pass along to the customers? 
A. I can't really speak to the severity of the 
increases.1 
1Jerry Dyer of Tel America did testify as to the consequences 
to the petitioners of implementation of the non-discounted FCC 
tariff at the state level: They would lose money. [R. 1377-78.] 
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R. 0334-35 (emphasis added). In other words, Mountain Bell's 
position was that it was experiencing revenue loss due to 
competition; it needed an access charge to offset that revenue 
loss so that NTS costs would be adequately covered at the local 
exchange level; the revenue loss couldn't be quantified at more 
than $1 million; the proposed access tariff might be enough, 
less than enough or more than enough (no one could say) to 
cover the NTS costs and offset the revenue loss; and, if it was 
more than enough, that windfall would just further subsidize 
local rates on some unanalyzed basis. 
Assuming, arguendo, that discrimination among customer 
classes may be allowable even to the point of subsidization, 
such discrimination must be reasonable: 
It is discrimination with no rational basis, and 
discrimination based on factors foreign to the 
regulatory scheme, which are aimed at by the 
preference statute. 
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, 636 P.2d, 1047, 1055 (Utah 1981); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-3-8 (1986). To implement an access charge the effect of 
which amounts to no more than speculation is unreasonable; 
where that effect may be to subsidize other customer classes at 
a level which may amount to a "windfall," at the expense of 
resellers and their customers is simply unjust. The 
Commission's approach is not only irrational, it is inequitable 
as well, as it amounts to approving a subsidy at an unknown and 
speculative level, for which no justification may exist. 
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This basic concept also serves to refute respondents' 
argument that Mountain Bell's 1985 general rate case rectified 
any deficiency in addressing the effect of the proposed access 
tariffs on rate of return. See Respondents' Brief at 16-17, 
37, In the Order resulting from this 1985 general rate 
proceeding, Mountain Bell accepted an adjustment for access 
charge revenue (projected by the Division) in the amount of 
2.325 million dollars, which commensurately reduced its 
requested revenue requirement. (Cf. the not more than $1 
million revenue loss which the access charge was to offset, 
supra.) Although this fact does support Mountain Bell's posi-
tion that "these new access revenues were taken into account 
and that Mountain Bell did not, by virtue of such tariffs earn 
an excessive rate of return" (Brief of Respondents at 16 - 17), 
the fact that the access charges were factored into rate of 
return in a subsequent proceeding does not resolve the question 
of whether the access charges were "just and reasonable" in the 
first place. It simply emphasizes the issue of whether the 
resellers' customers were being required to unfairly and 
unreasonably subsidize local service rates. 
E. Whether or Not Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(4) Applies to 
the Proceedings Below, the Utah Access Tarrif Must Still be 
Just and Reasonable. 
Petitioners do not agree that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(4), 
rather than § 54-7-12(2), applies to the proceeding below. 
Nevertheless, the Commission is under an obligation to 
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establish rates which are just and reasonable, whether the 
proposed rates are rate increases or simply for new services. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (1986). Thus, the petitioners' 
analysis of these issues applies equally to a Commission 
decision under either subsection of Utah Code Ann. 54-7-12. 
F. The Commission's Decision Implementing the Utah Access 
Tariff Without Sufficient Data Was Not Justified by the 
Exigencies of the Situation. 
Both the respondents and the Commission justify the 
implementation of the Access Tariff on the basis that competi-
tion already existed in the intrastate toll area,2 such 
competition could not be reasonably terminated (see R. 1501), 
and revenue which was being obtained from use of the interstate 
network for intrastate calls was being improperly allocated, 
possibly resulting in inadequate coverage of intrastate NTS 
Respondents devote considerable space in their Brief on appeal 
to a portrayal of Petitioners and other resellers as operating 
illegally and therefore presumably as unworthy of this Court's 
consideration on the issues presented on appeal. It is 
petitioners' position that whether the Resellers operated in 
violation of their certificates is not relevant to the issue of 
whether the tariff rates set by the Commission in this matter 
are just and reasonable. Certainly the Commission is not 
authorized to punish those subject to its rate-making 
jurisdiction by imposing punitive rate levels, nor is this what 
the Commission purported to do in its Report and Order. There 
are facts which perhaps mitigate the Commission's finding of 
violation of Resellers certificates, but the nature of the 
hearings did not invite lengthy explanation by the Resellers. 
The obligation of reseller certificates was repealed by the 
Utah Legislature in 1986, and any such issue is therefore 
rendered moot, and notice thereof may be taken by this Court. 
See Spreader Specialists, supra. 
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costs and consequent upward pressure on local exchange rates.3 
All parties to this proceeding accept that there was consider-
able pressure in the facts and circumstances existing in Utah 
after the AT&T divestiture requiring a decision by the 
Commission as to the issues of competition and access tariffs. 
Nevertheless, the fact that such pressures existed does not 
justify a departure from the legislative mandate that rates set 
must be just and reasonable. Despite the pressures involved in 
this proceeding, the Commission itself delayed issuing the 
Report and Order until October 31, 1985, more than ten months 
after the hearings concluded. In fact, the Commission had 
other options for dealing with the situation which were less 
draconian than the one it chose, including the establishment of 
an interim rate or the adoption of a form of "test year" to 
establish the necessary data. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12 
(1986); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Mexico 
Commission, 563 P.2d 588, 598 (N.M. 1977); Re Michigan Bell 
Telephone Co., 75 P.U.R.4th 349 (1986) (Commission established 
year to year rate revision proceedings in which problems, 
3It should be noted that where the interstate FGA lines were 
being used for intrastate calling by reseller customers, the 
revenues and the associated costs were being allocated to the 
interstate side. The potential revenue loss to Mountain Bell 
and the Independents from this misallocation was largely in the 
fact that a greater rate of return was allowed on the state as 
opposed to the interstate level and in the treatment of certain 
costs. (See, e.g., R. 1141, 1600-1605, 1873.) The most 
obvious factor in revenue loss was simply the loss of Mountain 
Bell market share as competition weakened its monopoly. 
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including the development of cost data, could be addressed and 
resolved on a periodic basis). 
Among other negative effects of the approach taken by the 
Commission in the instant case, the Report and Order adopts a 
final access tariff and leaves the development of needed cost 
data and other problem-solving to a powerless industry task 
force. At the high access rate levels adopted there is 
virtually no incentive for Mountain Bell and the Independents 
to actually develop and present adequate Utah-specific data, 
even though Mountain Bell witnesses testified that the proposed 
access tariff was "only a short-run solution." E.g., R. 265. 
The results of this are evident in that there has been no 
presentation to the Commission of the required Utah-specific 
data to this day, despite Mountain Bell's testimony that the 
methodology necessary to develop such data would be in place by 
mid-1985. R. 85. 
G. Petitioners' Focus During The Hearings On The FCC 
Tariff Discount Does Not Preclude Their Raising The Issues 
Before The Court On Appeal. 
Respondents point out that during the course of the 
hearings on this matter, petitioners' main focus was on its 
efforts to convince the Commission that if it decided to mirror 
the FCC rate it should also adopt the 55% discount imposed at 
the federal level for non-premium access. As a practical 
matter, petitioners had concluded that whether or not the 
actual FCC tariff rates reflected or approximated Utah specific 
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costs, petitioners could continue to function in a competitive 
environment as long as the full FCC tariff was mirrored, 
including the discount. The fact that Tel-America itself did 
not focus the majority of its testimony on attaching the 
concept of mirroring the FCC tariff is easily understandable in 
the context of the hearing, where it had substantial hope of 
convincing the Commission that the entire FCC package should be 
adopted rather than just those parts which Mountain Bell found 
favorable to its own purposes and where the dearth of 
Utah-specific cost support for the Mountain Bell access charge 
tariff proposal had already been brought to the attention of 
the Commission by witness after witness. In any event, whether 
or not petitioners focused on the issue at the hearings in this 
matter4 is not determinative of their right to raise that 
issue on this appeal, as the PSC has an independent duty to 
establish "just and reasonable" rates. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Company v. New Mexico State Corporation 
Commission, 563 P.2d 588, 595-596 (N.M. 1977). 
In fact, the Commission's decision denying implementation 
of the discount for non-premium service itself suggests the 
basic irrationality and injustice of the Utah Access Tariff 
rate adopted by the Commission. Paragraph 2 of the Findings of 
Fact reads as follows: 
4Jerry Dyer, president of Tel America, did raise the issue in 
his testimony before the Commission. See [R. 1354, 1383]. 
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2. National policy, primarily antitrust policy, does 
not persuade the Commission that state regulatory 
policy should encourage competition at the expense 
of reasonable service to the citizens of this 
state. Evidence on this record is inconclusive 
but does cast doubt on the soundness of encourag-
ing competition at the expense of reasonably 
priced service, particularly in areas outside the 
Wasatch Front. 
The effect of the Commission's finding is that, 
until clear and convincing evidence shows that 
the benefits of competition outweigh the effect 
of higher local service cost on universal 
service, Utah regulation will not encourage 
competition by providing the competitors of 
interexchange carriers discounts or allowing 
point-to-point competition, and will require 
access charges based on the non-discounted FCC 
tariff. 
Nevertheless, at Finding of Fact 23, the Commission found that 
"it is in the public interest to modify the certificates" of 
the resellers to allow them to compete on an intrastate, 
intra-LATA basis with Mountain Bell, using feature group 
services. R. 2724. 
Thus, the Commission allowed intrastate intra-LATA competi-
tion as being within the public interest, adopted the FCC 
access tariff rate, without any evidence that it was justified 
on the basis of Utah-specific cost data and then, in effect, 
dismissed the FCC decision imposing a 55% discount for non-
premium service (which the FCC required on the basis that the 
interstate resellers, who were provided inferior connections, 
could not compete with AT&T's superior connections without 
such a discount, see R. 1011, 1069-72, 1412-13), simply on the 
basis that, even though it allowed competition, the Commission 
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is not sure that it wants to "encourage" competition. Cf. 
Spreader Specialists, supra. 
Both with reference to the evidence before it and to its 
conclusions as set forth in the Report and Order, the 
Commission's decisions with regard to access tariff levels, 
discounts and competition simply lack any rational coherence. 
III. 
THE STAY PROVISION OPERATED TO SUSPEND THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ACCESS TARIFF. 
Only in the event that the Court upholds the Utah Access 
Tariff does the question of its effective date become an 
issue. In that event, the effective date of the Access Tariff 
should be February 6, 1986 since the effective date was 
suspended by the filing of the Petition for Review and/or 
Rehearing until that petition was denied on February 6, 1986. 
The Order, which was issued October 29, 1985, indicates 
that the Access Tariff becomes effective as of December 1, 
1985. This is the only effective date stated in the Report and 
Order and logically would be interpreted as the operative date 
in connection with bringing a petition for review and/or 
rehearing. The Commission's holding that the Report and Order 
was effective upon issuance, despite the December 1, 1985 
effective date contained therein, was arbitrary and capri-
cious. Moreover, the effect of this holding was to deny all 
possibility of a stay of the Access Tariff pending considera-
tion of a petition for review and/or rehearing. The statute 
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requires that a petition for review and/or rehearing be filed 
ten days or more before the effective date of an order to stay 
that order pending a determination on the petition. Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-7-15 (1986). By holding that the Report and Order 
was effective upon issuance, an impossibility was created: 
petitioners would be required to file an application for review 
or rehearing before the order was even issued and the contents 
of the order known. If the Commission has the right to 
preclude a party from obtaining a stay of an order by making it 
effective upon issuance as respondents contend, unavailability 
of a stay mechanism suggests due process shortcomings. See, 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Commission, 
124 Ariz. 433, 604 P.2d 1144, 1146 (1979). Therefore, if the 
Access Tariff is upheld, the Court should reverse the 
Commissions' determination that the filing of the petition for 
review and/or rehearing did not operate as a stay. 
IV. 
THE COMMISSION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT. 
Respondents argue that the Commission was not required to 
comply with the Administrative Rulemaking Act (the "Act"), 
since Title 54 prescribed the procedures the Commission must 
follow in this proceeding. The procedures cited by respondents 
in Title 54, however, deal with increases in rates and a single 
utility rather than generally applicable policies and multiple 
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classes and do not supplant the requirement of compliance with 
the Act in this proceeding.5 This unique generic proceeding 
was much more expansive than the narrow scope contemplated by 
the procedures in Title 54 and dealt with numerous "classes" of 
persons and issues affecting the telecommunications industry. 
The Report and Order set forth generally applicable policies or 
rules of the Commission with respect to telecommunications 
issues and otherwise implemented and articulated the 
Commission's policies on intra-LATA telecommunications services, 
thus clearly falling within the Act's definition of "rule." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(8)(a) (1986). 
The Commission's actions also affected several classes of 
persons; e.g. the class of telecommunications resellers, the 
class of telecommunications resellers' customers and the class 
of interexchange carriers. Rulemaking is required when agency 
action affects a class of persons. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3 
(1986). The Commission should have followed the specific 
procedures of the Act to ensure notice to those interested 
classes of persons of its proposed rules and policies. 
The Report and Order, or the relevant rules and policies 
therein, should have been filed as proposed rules and the 
appropriate public comment period followed. Instead, the 
5Respondents cite a provision of the Act which states that 
rulemaking is not required "when a procedure or standard is 
already described in statute." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(4)(a) 
(1986). This provision of the Code was repealed by the 1987 
Utah Legislature. 
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Commission issued its Report and Order and stated it was 
effective upon issuance. The failure of the Commission to 
follow the Act flawed the proceeding and may have denied 
interested parties the opportunity to comment on the 
Commission's proposed actions. Moreover, respondents assertion 
that petitioners suffered no prejudice by the failure to follow 
the Act is incorrect. If the Commission had followed the Act, 
a 30 day comment period would have been allowed and petitioners 
could have been allowed a hearing on the proposed rules. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-5 (1986). Challenging a proposed rule 
permits a party to proceed with at least an initial focal point 
- a proposed rule. As it was, the Commission implemented rules 
and policies without the notice that rulemaking affords and 
petitioners were not granted a hearing before the Commission 
following issuance of the Report and Order. 
The purpose of the Act is to ensure that appropriate notice 
and an opportunity to comment on a proposed policy or rule be 
given prior to the time it becomes final. Although notice of 
the hearings may have been given, neither petitioners nor any 
other interested persons were given notice of the proposed 
rules and policies nor the opportunity to comment before these 
policies and rules became final. The failure to follow the 
appropriate procedures of the Act fatally flawed the proceeding 
and is an additional factor which, when considered with the 
deficiencies in the Report and Order described herein, mandates 
that the Report and Order be set aside and remanded to the 
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Commission for a new hearing that comports with the require-
ments of the Act. 
V. 
THE ISSUE OF THE APPROPRIATE RATES FOR 
INTRASTATE ACCESS SERVICES IF THE ACCESS 
TARIFF IS SET ASIDE IS NOT AN ISSUE BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
Respondents' argument, that if petitioners are successful 
in this appeal they will end up paying higher WATS rates for 
intrastate access services, is not before the Court and tends 
to obfuscate the real issues in this petition for review. 
The Court's inquiry is limited to whether the Commission 
regularly pursued its authority in connection with its Report 
and Order. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1986). The Court may 
not modify the order of the Commission, but must either affirm 
or set aside the order under review. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-7-16(5) (1986). The respondents, however, urge the Court 
to take cognizance of issues not raised in the Report and Order 
and attempt to draw the Court into a discussion of the 
appropriate rates for intrastate access services if the Access 
Tariff is set aside. This effort to introduce new issues, 
requiring in effect new evidence, is beyond the scope of this 
Court's review. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1986). 
Moreover, respondents conclusions about the impact of the 
Access Tariff being set aside are conclusory and conjectural. 
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Even if the Access Tariff is set aside, the petitioners would 
not be limited to providing intrastate long distance services 
through the resale of WATS.6 Respondents cite no authority 
for the proposition that only existing WATS tariffs could be 
applied to intrastate services already furnished if the Access 
Tariff is set aside. The resolution of this issue is not 
before the Court, however, and is the proper subject of 
Commission inquiry. 
Finally, respondents argue that petitioners would not be 
entitled to a refund of any charges paid under the Access 
Tariff during the pendency of this appeal in the event of 
remand. This issue is also not before the Court. Moreover, 
this erroneous argument flies in the face of the Agreement 
entered into between Mountain Bell and Tel-America on March 6, 
1987 regarding refunds in the event the Report and Order is set 
aside, which agreement was approved by the Commission, and by 
this Court on March 13, 1987 in lieu of a suspending bond and 
with the same effect as a stay pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-7-17 (1974).7 
6At the time of the subject proceedings, resellers were subject 
to PSC regulation. A subsequent amendment of the Public 
Utilities Act removed sellers from PSC overview. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 54-2-1(30) (1986). 
Respondents acknowledge that Mountain Bell has entered into 
the Refund Agreement but state that neither Continental 
Telephone Co. nor any member of UIEC has done so and that no 
stay or suspending bond has been obtained as to them. Neither 
Continental nor any member of UIEC was made a party to the 
Refund Agreement for the simple reason that these entities do 
not provide access to petitioners and petitioners have paid 
them no moneys under the Access Tariff. 
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The Court should not be sidetracked from consideration of 
the legitimate issues raised in this petition for review by 
respondents* argument. In the event the Access Tariff is set 
aside, consideration of the appropriate rates for intrastate 
long distance services already provided to petitioners is 
statutorily the province of the Commission not the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners respectfully submit, that based on the forego-
ing analysis and the analysis in their principal Brief on 
Appeal, this Court should set aside the decisions of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah establishing an intrastate intra-
LATA and inter-LATA access charge tariff because the Commission 
exceeded its authority in implementing the Access Tariff and 
its Report and Order issued in connection therewith was arbi-
trary and capricious and not supported by the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stephen R< 
Jerry D. Fenn 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
SCMJDF115 
-24-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the cA day of September, 
1987, I served four copies of the foregoing Reply Brief on 
Appeal by mailing copies thereof first class, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
David L. Stott, Esq* 
Laurie L. Noda, Attorney 
Public Service Commission 
of Utah 
400 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ted D. Smith 
The Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph 
Company 
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the 
Reply Brief on Appeal, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Gary Witt, Esq. 
AT&T Communications of the 
Mountain States, Inc. 
1875 Lawrence Street, Suite 1575 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
A, Robert Thorup 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
Attorneys for GTE Sprint 
400 Deseret Building 
Post Office Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Arthur Brothers 
Beehive Telephone Company 
37 Q Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Kay M. Lewis 
Jensen & Lewis 
Attorneys for Mobile Telephone, Inc, 
320 South 300 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Bryan L. McDougal 
Attorneys for Telecommunications 
Resellers of Utah 
8 East Broadway, Suite 712 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
James J. Cassity 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
Attorneys for Utah Independent 
Exchange Carriers 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael Ginsberg 
Brian Burnett 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division of Public Utilities 
126 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
John M. Horsley 
Moyle & Draper 
Attorneys for Continental 
Telephone Company of the West 
600 Deseret Plaza 
15 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Randy L. Dryer 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
Attorneys for MCI 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David J. Salisbury 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall 
& McCarthy 
Attorneys for Mountain Bell 
50 South Main Street, #1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Sandy Mooy 
Assistant Attorney General 
Committee of Consumer Service 
126 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Jer 
